the Salazar regime installed a tight and centralised system of colonial rule everywhere. Each colony was under the control of a governor (governor-general in Angola and Mozambique) who was usually a military officer directly appointed by the Overseas Ministry. The governor had virtually absolute power and was only accountable to Lisbon: he ruled on legislative and financial matters, had executive power, and was directly responsible for law and order. As with the French, the Portuguese instituted a system of direct colonial rule based on the principles of assimilation. Colonial authority was vested locally in the hands of the chefe de posto (district officer) who worked with the assistance of African collaborators, traditional chiefs or, as was more often the case, 'colonial' or appointed chiefs. The chefe de posto was all powerful: at once adrninistrator, police chief, judge and tax collector.
The colonial administration remained far cruder in Guinea than in Angola and Mozambique.7 There, legislative councils, although largely token, were introduced in the 1950s whereas in Guinea the governor formally ruled alone until after the beginning of the colonial war, seeking or ignoring the advice of the consultative government council. In short, Portuguese colonial rule was rigid and centralised largely because the Portuguese regime continued to view its function primarily in terms of law and order at a time when French and British colonies were experiencing a measure of political and social progress. By the early 1960s Portugal had made some 'cosmetic' changes in its colonial administration, mainly due to UN pressure. In practice, however, colonial rule was the same as in the 1930s.8 Moreover, most of the changes which did occur concerned Angola and Mozambique, not Guinea.
It was not only administratively and politically that Guinea was the most neglected of the Portuguese colonies. It is widely recognised that Portugal did less to promote economic and social development than any other colonial power. The evidence suggests that it did substantially less in Guinea than in Angola and Mozambique, clearly the two most important colonies. Colonial rule in Guinea was crude and the benefits it brought were few. Much like the rest of West Africa, Guinea was turned into a supplier of primary agricultural products. The production of groundnuts was made mandatory while emphasis was placed on other products which the Portuguese could profitably export: coconut, palm oil, timber, etc.9 The structure of agricultural production as such was not changed by the Portuguese. Traditional colonial devices were used to guarantee the increased production of export crops: heavy taxes were levied and crop targets instituted. The shift to export crops had the overall and long term effect of reducing the villagers' ability to produce suff1cient amounts of food and replacement seeds for themselves. By the 1950s, Guinean agriculture was showing clear signs of decline and distortion.
The economic and commercial structure of Guinea 'indicated the colonial economy's increasing vulnerability and incapacity to develop.'l? By the f1fties, the balance of external trade was increasingly unfavourable to the colony. Commerce was in the hands of Portuguese private firms and the Portuguese government had done nothing to encourage investment in Guinea.1l They themselves had invested little beyond what was required for the exercise of colonial rule. There was no industry, no railroad, and a very limited road network. Guinea was believed to have no mineral or other resources and was consequently of little interest to industrialists and government alike.l2 Economically, colonial rule offered no prospect for development for the colony. Guinea, in that sense, was markedly different from Angola and Mozambique where Portugal had invested heavily. There they had sought to establish substantial white settlements and had encouraged massive foreign investment in mining, industry and transport after the Second World War.l3
There were few social benefits which Africans could derive from Portuguese colonial rulend fewer in Guinea than in the other colonies. Portugal itself was under the control of a powerful and effective fascist regime where no political rights could be exercised and where social benefits were non-existent. However, the situation was even worse in the colonies because of the legal distinction made between the assimilados and the indigenous. Only the former were entitled to the same 'benef1ts and privileges' as Portuguese citizens. Although the stated aim and the most cherished justification of Portuguese colonialism was the assimilation of its African population, the number of assimilados in the colonies remained insignif1cant: less than one per cent generally, and in Guinea less than 0 4 per cent. l4
One of the many requirements for the status of assimilado was literacy in Portuguese. Very few Guineans could fulfill that condition.l5 On the whole there were fewer schools and more illiterates in Portuguese colonies than in the rest of Africa and the situation was worse than in Angola and Mozambique. 16 In the Portuguese colonies state or official education was not available to the Africans; it was the privilege of the whites and assimilados. The education of the Africans had been placed entirely in the hands of the Catholic Church through an official agreement with the Holy See (1940). The nature and level of the education provided by the Church were such that few of the pupils acquired even the most rudimentary skill in reading and writing. Catholic education was ostensibly not designed to develop literacy but rather to promote 'good and civilised behaviour and attitudes'.l7 At any rate very few Guineans even had access to that second rate education. Virtually none had gone to secondary school.l8 It was estimated that, by the 1960s, only fourteen Guineans (some of them from Cape Verde) had had access to higher education.l9 The situation concerning health was not much better although in that area the data is even less reliable and more difficult to interpret than for education. To a large degree, then, Guinea had been left undisturbed by the Portuguese. This was only partly due to the reputedly bad climate of the colony and much more to the fact that Portugal, the poorest European nation, had neither been able nor willing to invest or attract investment into Guinea. There had rarely been in Guinea until the beginning of the war, more than 2,000 Portuguese, mostly civil servants or merchants.20 Thus the social and political structures of the population of Guinea had not been seriously altered by colonial rule. It was mainly the traditional economy which had been disrupted by the imposition of heavy taxation and the obligation to cultivate export crops.
Few observers at the end of the 1950s would have lent any credence to the feasibility of an armed struggle in Africa but least of all in Portuguese Guinea, the smallest and most backward of the Portuguese coloIlies. Colonial rule had not reached beyond the confines of the cities; cities were few and small.2l The impact of the colonial economy had been minimal. Unlike Angola and 16. See the very good discussion of education in Guinea by Rudebeck, op. cit., pp. 27-3l. Mozambique, there had been in Guinea no white settlement, no large-scale land alienation, minimal forced labour and no rural displacement, no acute impoverishment of the countryside or rural proletarianisation. There were, in short, none of the hallowed 'objective pre-conditions' widely deemed to be the requisites for political consciousness. In addition, there was no national consciousness per se although local resistance to the 'pacif1cation' campaigns had been strong. Perhaps even more than in the rest of West Africa, allegiances were ethnic and religious, at most regional. Colonial rule, or the opposition to it, had not brought about any sense of unity.22 This, then, was the context within which nationalism emerged in Portuguese Guinea and in which the PAIGC sought to challenge colonial rule.
A B7ief History of Nationalism, 1956 Nationalism, -1974 The development of nationalism in Portuguese Guinea underwent several stages. The PAIGC was created in 1956 after attempts to set up legal, cultural and sports associations had failed.23 Its programme, which called for independence and the unity of Guinea and Cape Verde, did not differ signif1cantly from similar manifestoes put forward in the neighbouring French colonies.24 Between 1956 and 1959, the PAIGC attempted to develop the sort of semilegal/constitutional agitation which was proving successful in the British and French colonies. At the time the party was pitifully small and almost entirely concentrated in Bissau (the capital of Portuguese Guinea) and some of the other major cities. The core of the party, many of whom were Cape Verdeans, was composed of what Cabral later described as 'petits bourgeois': civil servants, office employees, salaried workers.25 Despite their efforts the party remained small and, given the repressive context of the time, found it difficult to convey a credible nationalist message.26
The early PAIGC policy was a total failure because the Portuguese, unlike the British and the French, never envisaged initiating any 'dialogue' with the nationalist party and took every opportunity to imprison its militants. In August 1959, partly as a result of PAIGC agitation, Bissau port and dock workers called a strike (it was not the first) which the Portuguese decided to break by force: at least fifty were killed and several hundreds wounded.27 Following this incident, unexpected opportunity as the work required that he travel to all parts of the country and analyse the economic structures of agricultural production of the various regions and ethnic groups. The knowledge which he acquired of the countryside and of the socio-economic structures of the various ethnic groups was invaluable and unique. Indeed it was an experience which no other African nationalist leader had had. Cabral was able, as he later explained, to initiate contacts and discussions with villagers in order to probe their consciousness of the meaning of colonial rule and see how they might be willing to lend support to a nationalist movement. As a result of these contacts, Cabral grew markedly more realistic. What was truly remarkable, however, was the exent to which he understood the villagers, their modes of thinking, their way of life, the priorities which guided their lives and the problems they faced. There is no doubt whatever that this understanding was a key factor in the development of the PAIGC strategy and the success with which it was put into practice.33
Between 1960 How was the PAIGC the f1rst African movement of national liberation to achieve independence through armed struggle? The second part of this article will bring analysis to bear on the understanding of the PAIGC success in achieving national liberation on its own terms. For conceptual and historical reasons the analysis will focus firstly on the political and military aspects of the PAIGC strategy and secondly on the party policies in the areas in which it had acquired control.49 We shall look at the more immediate factors underlying the military progress of the PAIGC. We shall then examine in some detail the structural factors characterising the PAIGC's long-term policies and whether these justify the claim that a new society was being constructed in Guinea. At the outset, however, we must look at the context within which the PAIGC operated to determine whether there were historical or objective factors facilitating the development of a successful armed struggle.
It has been argued that one or several of the following factors explain the apparent ease with which the PAIGC made progress. Although there is some truth in the second point, there is no obvious correlation between the others and the PAIGC success. As concerns (1) and (3), it can equally well be argued that a smaller more backward country is more easily controlled by a colonial or foreign power.50 (4) and (5) are factually wrong: proportionately the Portuguese devoted more men and resources to the colonial wars than have other Western countries (e.g, the United States in Vietnam), and proportionately more in Guinea than in Angola and Mozambique.5' More importantly, however, as the Vietnamese and Algerian wars have made abundantly clear, the determining factor in a Western nation's failure to maintain control over an alien territory seeking independence through armed struggle is the politacal nature of wars of national liberation-not the military might which even the mightiest can muster. This was also certainly the case 1n oulnea.
A. Political Factors
Political factors are always more relevant to the understanding of national and/or social revolutions than military ones. This is particularly the case for the PAIGC where the dominance of the political over the military aspect of the struggle determined all the other policies. It was built into the structure of the party and was enforced with extreme vigour and consistency. It is therefore appropriate to begin our discussion with an analysis of the party itself.
Although the PAIGC was created in 1956, it was totally transformed in 1960 when Cabral came to Conakry to assume full charge of a party now preparing for war. He and the rest of the leadership rebuilt the party evolving new structures and training new cadres. The organisation of the party as such differed little from nationalist movements elsewhere.52 In the party guidelines, for instance, Cabral stressed four basic principles: revolutionary democracy) democratic centralism, collective leadership, criticism and self-criticism. The def1nition of these principles was similar to the standard ones given by nationalist, socialist or revolutionary parties the world over. Democratic centralism, for 50. In fact, I feel that on balance the size and backwardness of Guinea were favourable to the Portuguese. 51. Official Portuguese military documents show that, on average, 20% of the armed forces deployed in the colonial wars were in Guinea) 50% in Angola and 30% in Mozambique. Given the size and population of Guinea, these figures show quite clearly that the war was toughest in Guinea and that the Portuguese had to devote, proportionately, more resources and men there. example, was seen very much in the Leninist sense. But perhaps the concept of revolutionary democracy gives a better idea of the specific nature of the PAIGC. As Cabral saw it, it meant the balanced relations of power between the leaders, the party cadres and the people. It is clear, therefore, that he never under-estimated the importance of party organisation and discipline. What is more relevant to our discussion, however, is the way in which the principles were applied by the men and women who formed the PAIGC.53 In this respect, there were two features of the party which were important to its successful development: the nature and quality of the party cadres and the adaptability and flexibility of the party structures over the years. Both of these directly reflected Cabral's leadership. He believed that men, not party cadres, were the key to the development and organisation of a party capable of evolving and adapting new policies. It was undoubtedly on the human aspect of his political training that he placed the greatest emphasis. In fact, he took personal charge of the training of all the cadres during the early years of the struggle Most of them were dedicated but illiterate young villagers or city dwellers with no political knowledge or even consciousness, little experience of political agitation and even less understanding of war. Their training was essentially political and combined an emphasis on the history of Guinea and Cape Verde, an explanation of the mechanism of colonial rule and of the necessity for liberation with the most detailed preparation for the work of political mobilisation they would have to carry out in the countryside. Constant stress was placed on the political nature of the armed struggle. The support of the villagers, they were told, could only be acquired and maintained if and when the party policies were understandable and beneficial to them.54 In short, a concrete and pragmatic approach prevailed emphasising the difficult but indispensable task of mobilising the reluctant villagers inside Guinea. The care with which the cadres were trained largely explains their dedication and effectiveness.
The PAIGC underwent several changes during the war, all designed to correct iIladequacies and to provide practical solutions to concrete problems. For example, the PAIGC started out as a highly decentralised party out of necessity. This meant that often cadres operating in the countryside exercised a large degree of autonomy which resulted in frequent abuses of authority. The leadership responded to this situation by re-defining patterns of authority and increasing central control. Later, the party was de-centralised once again, reflecting the new reality of control over the liberated areas where priority was now given to reconstruction, and no longer on war alone.55 On the whole, then, the PAIGC was constantly adapting itself to the conditions imposed by the struggle, taking particular care to combat party bureaucracy and insufficient sensitivity on the part of the cadres towards the population of the liberated areas. The greatest emphasis was placed upon the successful integration of party cadres to local life and on the harmonious development of the links between the party and the villagers.
The first and most important aspect of the PAIGC strategy was political mobilisation. Although the party had had no experience in the countryside, Cabral seems to have understood from the beginning that the only feasible and realistic policy was to gain the political support of the villagers. It would have been totally futile, he argued, to launch the armed struggle before such mobilisation had been effectively carried out.56 Political mobilisation in the context of Guinea at the time literally meant going from village to village seeking to gain the confidence of the rural propulation. This was not always forthcoming and it remained one of the central objectives of the party to win not only the tacit but the active support of the villagers.57
As in all revolutions in which the peasantry played a major role (most notably China and Vietnam) this proved an exceedingly difficult task. The PAIGC suffered many setbacks. Repression was very severe for villagers who were found to have had contacts with the guerrillas. Villagers at times denounced the cadres who were then arrested, tortured and killed. The fact simply is that conditions in Guinea were not particularly favourable to mobilisation. As we have noted, unlike other colonies, there yvere no new or compelling reasons which might have stirred the villagers into action: exploitation and repression were not noticeably worse in 1960 than they had been in 1950 for those who refused contact with the PAIGC. It is therefore all the more remarkable that with so few cadres the PAIGC was able to do as much as it did between 1960 and 1963, succeeding in its efforts to achieve sufficient political mobilisation in order to launch the armed struggle on a f1rm footing.
The military successes which the PAIGC obtained in 1963 and 1964 show how effective political mobilisation had in fact been. As the guerrillas were 55. It should not be inferred from these remarks that the PAIGC was anything but a very well organised and tightly-knit party. No war of national liberation would succeed in the absence of such a party. My remarks are intended to show the change and evolution of the PAIGC, not its lack of organisation. 56. It must be re-emphasised that this was a new idea in the context of Africa at the time. It is also one which was entirely Cabral's. He said later that he had not read Mao Tse Tung until 1961. 57. This is what Cabral said later: 'It was a difficult problem to solve for the struggle: how to prove to the peasant that he was exploited on his own land. We could not mobilise people by telling them: 'Land to those who till it', because here there is no lack of land . . . We therefore had to find appropriate forms to mobilise our peasantry instead of using terms that our people could not understand. We never mobilised our people on the basis of the struggle against colonialism. operating entirely from within the country they would not have have survived, let alone have made progress, without the support and participation of the villagers. This success can only be explained by the fact that Cabral managed to instil in the cadres he trained the belief that mobilisaiion was possible and to give them the practical tools they would require once in the villages. It is here that Cabral's experience in and understanding of the countryside helped. This extreme emphasis on the importance of political mobilisation and on the cadres' ability to live with and relate to the villagers continued throughout the war and is evident today.58 Another important aspect of the party was its lack of ideological dogmatism or rigidity. While its general social and political orientation might broadly be def1ned as socialist, PAIGC documents are singularly devoid of abstract references to ideology such as, for example, Marxism-Leninism or African Socialism.59 There is, on the other hand, a constant concern with the nature of the Guinean revolution and repeated reference to the concrete aspects of the situation prevailing in Guinea at the time.60 Cabral, who used Marxist theory in his analytical texts, consistently refused to be drawn into ideological discussions or definitions.6' He emphasised to the PAIGC cadres and to the outside world that a successful national revolution would evolve its own ideology partly from the general body of socio-political doctrines but more importantly from the economic, social, and political reality it faced in the country itself.
This unusually pragmatic attitude towards ideology had several distinct advantages. Firstly, it greatly enhanced the cohesion of the party and facilitated political mobilisation in the countryside. It meant that, at all levels of the party, documents and discussions could easily be understood and transmitted. The PAIGC expressed its ideas, goals, and methods through a medium readily intelligible to all cadres and villagers. This partly explains the success with which the cadres managed to approach and convince villagers before the war began. Traditional reluctance to accept foreign ideas was reduced because the ideas expressed were neither new nor foreign. In addition, such absence of ideological and abstract jargon removed the barrier and hierarchy which, more often 58. The early policy of sending the cadres back to their region of origin on the grounds that they would be more easily acceptable and would know the language and customs had to be abandoned. It turned out that traditional pressures which they could not always resist were too great on the guerrillas. As from the mid-1960s, the PAIGC systematically sent cadres to all regions and rotated them on a regular basis. 59. This is very clear in the programme. See 'Programa do partido' (PAIGC, n.l., n.d.). 60. Perhaps the most famous statement on the PAIGC's ideology is the following. 'Always remember,' Cabral told his cadres, 'that people are not fighting for ideas, nor for what is men's mind. The people fight and accept the sacrifices demanded by the struggle in order to gain material advantages, to live better and in peace, to benefit from progress, and for the better future of their children. National liberation, the struggle against colonialism, the construction of peace, progress and independence are nothing but hollow words devoid of any significance unless they can be translated into a real improvement of living conditions.' Amilcar Cabral, 'Palavras de ordem gerais.', op. cit., p. 23. than not in revolutionary political organisations, separates those who know how to manipulate the changing ideological idiom from those who do not.
On this aspect see the answer he gave to a question asked in London in 1971 in
Secondly, this aspect of the PAIGC worked to reduce the frequency and intensity which ideological disputes might have had within the party itself. Since there was no 'party line' or immutable body of 'correct ideas', the tendency and temptation to exclude cadresnd hence to split the partyn the basis of dissenting political opinions was limited. And, indeed, the PAIGC was one of the rare political movements in Africa not to be plagued by ideological disputes and party splits. Finally, this lack of doctrinal rigidity enabled the PAIGC to avoid becoming involved in the divisions and disputes which have beset the socialist world, especially since the Sino-Soviet split. The PAIGC was one of the few movements of national liberation to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union and its allies as well as with China.62 This also allowed, and still allows, the PAIGC to pursue a vigorous foreign policy of non-alignment, seeking and obtaining aid and support from a wide range of countries.
There are two further distinct, but related, political factors which must be taken into account when seeking to analyse the success of the PAIGC: the first has to do with the question of nationalist unity in Guinea, the other concerns PAIGC diplomacy. The lack of unity among and within nationalist movements in Africa has probably been the single most vexing problem. It is therefore important to see how the PAIGC achieved unity. One is tempted to answer that the PAIGC side-stepped the issue. It got on with the job of political mobilisation and armed struggle and the problem took care of itself. It is after all clear that the structure and ideology of the party made it relatively immune to internal splits while its political strategy in the countryside made the task of political competitors a difficult one. The PAIGC was visibly the only party to carry out the nationalist struggle.
But the process was not nearly as smooth as it appears to be and the evidence shows that the PAIGC leadership was well aware of the dangers of disunity and worked hard to avoid them. Partly through persuasion and diplomacy, partly through cunning, Cabral rapidly coopted the most serious nationalist competitors inside and outside Guinea. This was achieved by careful and sustained efforts to accept, rather than exclude, any self-proclaimed nationalist. At the same time, he made visible and repeated efforts at coming to terms with those rival nationalist groups which refused to cooperate with the PAIGC.63 Whether genuine or not such efforts at least served the purpose of showing the outside world that the PAIGC, the strongest and most credible nationalist movement in Guinea, was attempting to collaborate with its weaker rivals in order to achieve unity. Although this attempt at complete unity failed, by the mid-1960s the credibility. (4) The war was to be 'clean', i.e., terrorism, attacks on civilian targets and reprisals were ruled out on principle; Portuguese prisoners and deserters were to be well treated. (5) PAIGC casualties had to be kept at the lowest possible minimum by adhering rigidly to the basic principle of guerrilla war of avoiding frontal attack or confrontation with a better equipped Portuguese army.7l (6) The guerrilla war was to move from the countryside towards the cities, encircling them but not seizing them. It would be far too costly in terms of lives, Cabral argued, to take over (and especially to hold) cities.
Although the ultimate success of the PAIGC does indicate that these principles were followed with a large degree of consistency, it would be factually wrong to suggest that the armed struggle evolved without difficulties.72 The main problems which the PAIGC faced, as do all guerrilla movements, concerned politics. It was difficult, and not always possible, to train cadres with sufficient political consciousness and discipline to adhere to the above principles and to accept, in practice, the dominance of the political over the military wing of the party. The most common and damaging mistake arose from the often irresponsible behaviour of certain cadres who abused their military power and alienated the population. This problem, in fact, reached dangerous proportions and threatened the very existence of the party during the first years of the war. military policy subsequently enforced with the greatest vigour. But even more importantly, the Congress began a thorough re-organisation of the party.
Although inadequate political training was partly to blame for the militarism of the early years, the PAIGC leadership now sought to develop structural safeguards against a tendency which is built into the very dynamics of guerrilla war. The decisions taken at and after the Cassaca Congress led to the separation of the political and military aspects of the struggle and the creation of distinct political and military structures. The original autonomous guerrilla groups were gradually replaced by a national army, the FARP, capable of operating anywhere in the country. The basic fighting unit of the FARP was the bi-grupo (double group), a combination of two distinct commandos of 15-25 men normally operating together but capable of separating and remaining operational.76 This gave the FARP extreme flexibility of action. Bi-grupos could also be brought quickly together when necessary into units of several hundred men coordinated by a pre-arranged command structure. The structure of the bi-grupo was found to be the most suitable to the conditions in Guinea and was maintained until the end of the war.77
New geographical and hierarchical structllres were set up and regional commands created for each front (south and north, later east). A central organ, the Conselho de (buerra (War Council), was now in direct control of all military operations.78 The regional command was in effect the key to the new military edifice as it was in constant contact with the War Council and the lower echelons of the military in the field. It is largely because of the skills and dedication of the regional commanders, the best PAIGC cadres, that the party military structure became so effective.
However, by far the most original and important innovation made by the PAIGC to ensure political dominance within the military was the system of 'dual command'.79 At all levels of the military apparatus, from the bi-grupo upwards, leadership was exercised by two men: the commander, who was the ultimate authority for military operations and the political commissar, second in the military hierarchy and in charge of political mobilisation. Unlike the experience of the Russian Red Army during the civil war, the disiinction between the two men was not a military one since it was frequently the case that positions between them could be, and often were, inter-changed.80 All political commissars were also qualified military commanders but their specific responsi-76. They were usually armed with rifles, light and heavy machine guns and mortars. Later some special groups carried heavier artillery: 75 mm and -105 mm cannons. 77. An attempt had been made in the mid-1960s to create larger fighting units but the idea was abandoned after it became obvious that they did not operate satisfactorily. 78. It is relevant to point out that Amilcar Cabral was at the head of the Conselho de Guerra and generally kept a very close control over military operations. 79. 'Dual command' is my own term. It is not to be found in PAIGC documents because in practice there was no separation between the two men. There was no rank either in the military units except for that of commander and political commissar. 80. In the Russian case, the political commissars were not military commanders but party cadres responsible for keeping a check on the military commanders, many of whom were former Tsarist officers.
bilities concerned the political aspects of the war. Clearly, the idea was to build into the structure of the armed forces an effective check against militarism and it is significant that the system of dual command survived all subsequent reorganisations of the politico-military structures of the party.
C. Social Factors: the Construction of a New Society
To many, the most significant aspect of national liberation in Guinea was the reconstruction of the liberated areas.8l For the PAIGC this was evidently the most effective way of gaining and maintaining the support of the population. But it was also a great deal more than that. The attempt at constructing a new society in the liberated areas was based on the conscious premise that the revolutionary transformation of Guinea had to be initiated before, not after, 82. This is one of the reasons why the size of the army was kept to a minimum. One of the other reasons is that the PAIGC leadership did not want to commit more men than they had to do. They were concerned to send as many as possible abroad for technical training. Finally, a large army is usually a threat to the political control of a war. 83. This section is one where I have had to be the most sketchy and to limit my remarks to the briefest summary. It is, however, well covered in Rudebeck, op. cit. In 1966, a new judicial system was introduced in the liberated areas. Its most original feature was the direct participation of the villagers in their own jusiice.9l Village Tnbunais do Povo (People's Courts) were created to which the judges were elected by the villagers from their own village. The judges, like the village committeee members, were only maintained in their position so long as the villagers were satisfsed that they were carrying out their duties satisfactorily. As in the case of the election of the village committees, the PAIGC interfered little with the choices made. The courts, which settled non criminal offences, followed traditional law (with only minor modifications) and sought reconciliaiion and retribution rather than punishment.92 Both the committees and the courts seem to have worked relatively well because the best and most respected villagers were usually elected. In addition, there was great community and peer pressure to cooperate with these new institutions and to comply with the decisions taken. The PAIGC reported, for example, that petty crime diminished considerably after the introduction of the village courts.
By 1968, local defence and security had been placed entirely in the hands of the villagers and arms had been distributed to the population. The original People's Miliiiae were replaced by local armed forces (FAL) with much better military training and greatly increased fire power.93 The FAL quickly became an important component of the PAIGC forces and an essential factor in the protection of civilians when the Portuguese intensified their helicopter attacks. They also relieved the FARP from civilian defence duties and increased their offensive capacity. Finally, they gave the villagers a sense of security they had never had before. The evidence shows quite clearly that, despite the small size The most significant aspect of the PAIGC policies concerning the preparation for independence was the decision to break the party-state equation by creating democratic state insetutions separate from the party. To that end, elections were held in 1972 to select regional councillors and members of the national assembly.97 A popular national assembly (ANP) thus came into being. This certainly was, and remains, the only example of a national liberation and/or revolutionary movement holding democratc elections before independence. The election procedures did not follow liberal democratc traditions but rather the single list system where the option was to vote 'yes' or 'no' to the entire list. The important part of the elections, therefore, was not the ballot casting exercise but the nomination process.
The villagers themselves selected their representatives to the regional councils and there is plenty of evidence to suggest that, when the candidates were not acceptable, they were not nominated.98 Again, as in the case of the elections for the village committees and courts, the PAIGC interfered little although it did supervise the nomination procedures. An important safeguard was built into the electoral process to prevent the PAIGC from gaining absolute control of the newly elected organs: two-thirds of the candidates had to be non-party members. This restriction was, in fact, applied so strictly that even village 94. There are no official figures but PAIGC reports and communiques show that, after the villagers had beeen moved out of their villages into safer places, casualties would have been a few hundred per year at most. This is indeed very low compared to other wars of national liberation where, as a rule, the population suffers heavily. 95. By party-state, the PAIGC meant a party which had all the attributes of a state-government except legal international recognition. The term was intended to convey the picture that the PAIGC was already running the country successfully. See Aristides Pereira, Op. Cit. 96. Here Cabral's realism showed again. There would be no point, he argued, in declaring an independence that no one else would recognise. This is also the reason why he remained against the formation of a government in exile. Given the problems of the GRAE in Angola or of the POLISARIO today, one can only concur. 97. The elections for the regional councillors were through universal suffrage. Regional councillors then elected members of the National Assembly from among their own number. 98. See among others, Rudebeck, Op. Cit., pp. 156-167. committee members, although not formally PAIGC members, were not eligible unless they resigned.
Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to validate the claim that such elections were democratic in the Western liberal sense, it is possible to conclude that they were free, fair, and representative. This interpretation is confirmed by the results of the 1976 elections, the first after independence, in which a substantial number, and in cerain cases a majority, of 'no' votes were recorded in areas where either the candidates were not acceptable or PAIGC support was low.99 It would therefore be wrong and misguided to argue that only a strict recourse to liberal democratic procedures particularly multi-party system and party competition-lend meaning and legitimacy to a political process. In the final analysis, the basic reason why the elections were free and fair (indeed, took place at all) lay less in the elections procedures themselves than in the nature of the PAIGC, the support it had acquired in the liberated areas, the relationship it had developed with the population, and the social and political structures it had established in the villages. On the whole the PAIGC had encouraged, and continues to encourage, the role of local institutions as centres of countervailing power to party rule. This was what the leadership saw as the best check against party abuses.l??
This article has, of necessity, restricted itself to the broadest outline of events and interpretation. The analytical part has sought to bring out the salient features and the significance of national liberation in Guinea in terms which might enable comparisons with other African and non-African cases. The argument developed suggests a combination of factors to explain the success of the PAIGC. But little has been said, and then only implicity, about the role of leadership in general and about Cabral in particular. Passing reference was made to Cabral's unique experience in the Guinean countryside and to his skills as a political teacher and a diplomat.
However, the evidence generated during the course of research on GuineaBissau makes it abundantly clear that Cabral was the key to the success of the PAIGC. Although the argument cannot be adequately developed here, a number of points can be made.l?' Firstly, most decisions in the PAIGC were taken by Cabral and he was in fact the undisputed leader, thinker and strategist of the party. Secondly, it can be established with a certain degree of precision how the most original and significant aspects of the PAIGC poliiical strategy were directly the product of Cabral's views and ideas. For example, the decision to create a party around the policy of unity between Guinea and Cape Verde and the refusal to use terrorism as a political weapon, 99. The PAIGC had little support in some of the areas still controlled by the Portuguese at independence, especially in the cities, partly because the population there feared victimisationwhich did not occur. 100. This is indeed the major reason for the elections as it is obvious that, given their position in 1972, the PAIGC could easily have dispensed with such an exercise. 101. This is, however, the subject of my proposed Cambridge thesis.
can only be traced to Cabral.l02 Thirdly, using counterfactual analysis it is possible to suggest) obviously not to prove, that in the absence of Cabral nationalism in Guinea would not have developed as it did, much as the Russian revolution would in all likelihood not have succeeded without Lenin.
The historical evidence suggests that the single most important factor which prompted the Portuguese revolution of April 1974, in which the armed forces overthrew the fascist regime and restored democracy, was the prospect of military defeat in Guinea. It can also be shown that Cabral had a direct influence on the military who organised themselves into the Movement of the Armed Forces (MFA) which carried out the Lisbon coup. The April revolution in turn restored democracy in Portugal and ushered in decolonisation in the other Portuguese colonies. The independence of Angola and Mozambique had a direct impact on the situation in Southern Africa. Although we must beware of 'one man history', it is important not to overlook the distinct role of Cabral's leadership, not only inside, but also outside, Guinea.
